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The procurement costs of military hardware have risen dramatically
in recent years. Presently, there is a great deal of pressure exerted
on military officials to control the rising procurement costs. One of
the more promising techniques being used toward this end is known as
"Should Cost Analysis." Should cost is a cost analysis technique that
provides the government with an independent cost estimate for produc-
tion contracts.
Currently, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the General
Accounting Office (GAO) all conduct independent should cost analyses
whenever they deem it appropriate to do so. This paper proposes that,
as an alternative to the present employment of the should cost con-
cept, all future should cost studies be controlled and conducted by
the GAO alone. The author of this paper feels that, if adopted, this
alternative would result in the more cost-effective application of




Rapidly rising procurement costs of modern weapons systems have
resulted in increasing pressure for the efficient utilization of de-
fense dollars. Today's weapons are far more complex, sophisticated,
and expensive than were their predecessors. While the cost of wea-
pons systems has increased, the actual buying power of the military
has been declining in recent years.
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The high cost of production of modern weapons has decreased the
number of contractors able to compete for contracts. In many large
dollar value procurements, there is no effective competition at all,
In these cases, the normal procurement methods (which rely on free
competition) are inadequate to protect the best interests of the




Should cost is a concept which provides the Government with an
alternative to the production contract proposal submitted by a sole-
source supplier. A should cost analysis is a very thorough industrial
efficiency study performed on a defense contractor by a team of gov-
ernment specialists in various industrial fields.
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Should cost studies are performed in order to obtain better con-
tract terms than would have been attained using normal procurement
methods. An equally important goal is improvement in the operating
efficiency of defense contractors. Should Cost re-directs manage-
ment's attention towards areas of operation that have become ineffi-
cient.
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Should cost studies will not be conducted unless the expected
benefits from such studies will exceed costs. The Government must
have an adequate amount of money, time, and manpower available before
a should cost study can be undertaken. Certain conditions concerning




Each should cost analysis is unique, because the conditions lead-
ing up to each study are different. There is, however, a general
similarity in form among all studies. First, the magnitude and scope
of the study is decided upon. Second, an advance team inspects the
contractor's plant. Third, the full team arrives at the plant and
conducts the should cost study. Fourth, the data from the study is
analyzed. When all this has been done, the Government proceeds with
contract negotiations.
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At Present, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and GAO all conduct should
cost analyses when they deem it necessary to do so. Each of these
agencies has distinctive requirements to satisfy so each agency's
version of should cost is slightly different from the other.
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PROBLEMS WITH SHOULD COST
A should cost analysis represents a tremendous drain on valuable
government agency resources. A should cost study is expensive to
perform. It is difficult to supply manpower with the necessary talent
without placing an excessive burden on the agencies supplying the
personnel. It is difficult (and expensive) to train new personnel in
the intricacies of should cost.
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Problems often arise with the contractor who is to receive the
study. A should cost study can severely disrupt a contractor's oper-
ation. The contractor may not want to extend the findings of a study
to all his other government contracts. He may not want to permit his
management's valuable time to be spent answering should cost team
questions. The contractor may have serious doubts about the competence
of the should cost team members.
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Current military should cost teams are not totally independent
of the contractor. Both the military and the contractor have an in-
terest in producing the weapon in question as quickly as possible.
Military should cost teams are not always objectively critical of mil-




All should cost authority should be concentrated in one single
agency. That agency should create a permanent should cost staff hav-
ing a professional attitude toward should cost. The emphasis of
future studies should be more fully directed toward broad, long term
improvements in contractor efficiency. The agency selected for sole
should cost responsibility ought to be independent of both the mili-
tary and the contractors. It should be fully capable of conducting
many studies.
Page 41
THE GAP AS THE SHOULD COST AGENCY
In this writer's opinion, the GAO should be the agency selected to
conduct all future ahould cost studies. In recent years the functions
of the GAO have been expanded to include many areas of management
study. The GAO's primary duty remains as the monitor of Federal ex-
penditures, but its methods now include much more than accounting.
Should cost is compatible with the GAO's function of monitoring expen-
ditures of federal agencies. The GAO has an excellent vantage point
from which to view the impact of should cost studies. It is an inde-
pendent and influential agency. Teamwork, which is important for
successful should cost studies, is a characteristic of GAO audit teams,
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The GAO should be granted additional legal authority in order to
conduct should cost studies. It should create a permanent should cost
staff to conduct or coordinate all should cost studies. Special atten-
tion should be paid by the GAO to the composition and dissemination of
detailed reports on its should cost studies.
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It would be necessary for the Congress and the military, as well
as the GAO, to have a formal method for recommending that a should
cost study be performed on specific contractors. The final decision
on whether or not to conduct any given study would rest with the GAO.
The actual mechanics of a GAO should cost study would be the same as
they are at present. After the GAO had completed its study, the mil-
itary agencies would conduct the contract negotiations making
whatever use they saw fit of the GAO study results.
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS
The GAO would be better able to carry out its present duties re-
lating to the monitoring of defense procurement agencies. It would
have a better understanding of where defense money goes and of the
actual problems facing the defense industry. The GAO would be able




The military would be freed of the necessity of staffing should
cost studies with its talented procurement people, It would save the
money and manhours that go into supporting such efforts. The mili-
tary would also benefit indirectly from the increased understanding
that GAO would acquire of defense procurement difficulties.
Page 61
The nation as a whole would benefit from the resulting improvements
of utilization of tax dollars for defense. The reports by the GAO
to Congress would enlighten the Congress on the subject of defense pro-
curement. A well-informed Congress woukd make decisions on policy




Military planners are currently finding themselves under an ever
increasing pressure to control the rising cost of modern day weapons
systems. A number of cost control techniques have been employed in
an attempt to obtain, at a reasonable price, the weapons necessary
for national defense. One of the more promising of these techniques
is called "Should Cost Analysis" (or should cost) . Should cost is a
method of contract pricing which provides the government negotiators
with a firmer bargaining position during contract negotiations. When
properly employed, the should cost concept can promote long term im-
provements in the efficiency of major defense contractors. While
should cost has demonstrated exciting potential, it is not without
draw-backs. This thesis is based on research done on should cost.
This writer later proposes an alternative method of utilizing the
should cost analysis concept. Many of the problems (later described)
which occur with present should cost techniques would be reduced or
avoided by using the proposed alternative.
A. BACKGROUND
One need only look at today's weapons systems to understand why
the cost of military procurement has risen so dramatically. In order
to maintain a safe degree of military superiority over potential
enemies, it is necessary to produce and deploy weapons with a high
degree of technological advancement. Weapons must possess capabili-
ties and accuracies never before required (e.g. aircraft must be
maneuverable and yet carry a heavy weapon load, missiles must travel
great distances and impact on precisely the correct spot) . To meet

these demanding requirements, extensive expenditures of the nation's
valuable resources must be made to both advance the technological
state-of-the-art and to complete the production of weapons subsequently
developed. Today's weapons systems are much more ' sophisticated and
complex than any of their predecessors. This complexity adds to the
degree of difficulty in producing and maintaining these systems.
Finally, the rate at which our weapons systems become obsolete has
never been as great. All of these factors combine to make the price
of military preparedness higher than at any time in our history.
While the price of weapons systems continues to increase, mili-
tary planners are encountering more and more difficulty in obtaining
needed funds. If one adjusts the dollar for inflation, it can be seen
that the military procurement budget (i.e. real buying power) has
actually decreased in recent years.-*- The emphasis of government
spending has shifted away from defense and is now focused on correcting
long neglected social ills. The long, grueling war in Southeast Asia
has fostered among many civilians a general unpopularity of the mili-
tary. There is a strong popular sentiment to curtail the power of
the military establishment. This sentiment is reflected in Congress
!ln 1970 expenditures for defense totaled $80,295,000,000 or 40.8
percent of the federal budget. In 1972 defense expenditures totaled
$77,512,000,000 or 33.8 percent of the budget. See pages 29 and 30
of Reference A. (Note: These sums are expressed in 1970 and 1972
respectively.
2According to an article in the U. S. News and World Report , Vol.
LXXIV, No. 6, February 5, 1973, the amount spent on defense will rise
from $78.3 billion in fiscal 1972 to $81.1 billion in fiscal 1974.
During that same period, the amount spent on various socially oriented
programs will rise from 103.0 billion to 131.8 billion.

and has resulted in closer scrutiny of military budget requests. Thus,
the military is faced with the dilemma of having to obtain weapons
systems that are growing more and more expensive on a budget that is
growing smaller and smaller.
B. MILITARY PROCUREMENT
The Congress of the United States has empowered the President, as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to establish agencies to ex-
pend the monies appropriated by Congress for the maintenance of the
Armed Forces. The Secretary of each of the Armed Forces, acting for
the President, have established the methods by which the money is
actually spent. In order to make military fiscal policies more re-
sponsible and economical, the Congress enacted (in 1947) the Armed
Services Procurement Act. Included in this act were the Armed Ser-
vices Procurement Regulations (ASPR) [Ref.B]. The ASPR dictated the
standards to which all military procurement agencies must adhere in
conducting their contracting activities. It provides detailed guid-
ance on virtually all aspects of contracting.
The purpose of ASPR is to protect the Government from consequences
of faulty contracting policies and procedures. If followed to the
letter, the policies specified by the ASPR will help ensure that the
Government will not enter into a contract that is not in its own best
interest. The ASPR relies heavily upon free and open competition to
provide the Government with a fair and reasonable market price. It
specifies that, if at all possible, government contracting personnel
must utilize price competition in their contracting efforts. If
^ASPR 2-102 and 3-101 require the maximum practical competition
consistant with the nature of the procurement.
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competition is not feasible, then a full and careful review by high
ranking officials is mandatory.
The ASPR defines four categories of procurement that may be en-
countered. All military procurements will fall into one of these
categories.
1. Formal Advertising
Formal advertising is the simplest f the four procurement
methods. It makes the greatest use of the competitive market environ-
ment, and is required by ASPR to be used if at all possible. The
Naval Material Command publication Defense Procurement Management
[Ref . C] discusses formal advertising in detail. Formal advertising
can only be effective when a procurement satisfies the following four
. - kprerequxsxtes
:
(1) Definite specification are available.
(2) There are two or more suppliers who can fulfill the
demand.
(3) The successful bidder can be selected on the basis of
the price alone.
(4) Sufficient time is available to allow the formalities
involved to be carried out.
Due to the complexity of current military weapons, most procurements
do not satisy all of these prerequisites for the use of formal adver-
tising. In 1971, formal advertising accounted for only 7.3 percent of
all Navy procurement [Ref. d] .
^See page 33, Ref. C.

2. Two-Step Formal Advertising
Two-step formal advertising is very similar to formal adver-
tising, but it includes an extra step in order to obtain more
competition. With formal advertising, the Government simply issues
Invitations for Bids (IFB) to all qualified suppl.iers of the product
desired. Two-step formal advertising involves both technical competi-
tion and price competition. Step one consists basically of describing
the requirements to all qualified defense contractors. This is accom-
plished by the issuance of a Request for Technical Proposal (RTP) by
the procuring agency in accordance with ASPR 2-503 (a) [Ref. B] . Any
defense contractor wishing to respond will submit to the procuring
agency a detailed technical proposal (but no price information) . In
step two, the procuring agency selects those proposals it considers
feasible and conducts price competition using procedures similar to
formal advertising (discussed earlier) . This widens the range of
acceptable proposals and, thus, results in increased competition. The
two-step method can only be used where specifications are somewhat
flexible. There are very few cases where two-step formal advertisii
,
is particularly useful. In 1971, the two-step methods accounted fo





Negotiation will be used whenever, in the opinion of the Gov-
ernment, its use will result in a better contract price than would
the use of formal advertising or if formal advertising is not feasible
and practicable. The ASPR [Ref. B] lists seventeen specific excep-
tions to the requirement for the use of formal advertising. All
negotiated procurements must fall under one of these seventeen
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exceptions. As the name implies, competitive negotiation involves
the simultaneous negotiation with two or more manufacturers with the
intent of selecting the best procurement package for the Government.
Competitive negotiation affords the Government a great degree of flex-
ibility in the design of the product it receives. To a great extent,
the effect of open market competition is maintained. The only major
draw-back to this type of procurement is that much time, money, and
manpower is required to conduct the negotiations. The existence of
competition relieves the Government of the necessity of conducting ex-
tensive analyses of contract prices. Competitive negotiation is easier
and less expensive than is non-competitive contract negotiation. In
1971, competitive negotiation accounted for 22.3 percent of Navy pro-
curement dollars [Ref. D]
.
4. Non-Competitive Negotiation
In spite of all efforts to promote competition, the nature of
military needs forces the use of sole-sourse suppliers for many mili-
tary weapons procurement. These sole sole-source suppliers are
generally used for the major weapons programs, consequently, they re-
ceive a large portion of the procurement funds. In these situations,
the total lack of competition forces the Government to perform de-
tailed analyses of the costs involved in the production of the item in
question. Cost Analysis of a major defense program is an extremely
involved undertaking requiring significant allocations of time, money
and manpower. A negotiation conducted with a sole-source supplier
almost always turns out to be more complex and expensive than would
have been the case had adequate competition been available. In 1971,
non-competitive negotiation accounted for 69.7 percent of all Navy
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procurement dollars [Ref. DJ . It is in this category of military pro-
curement that most cost growths have occurred. To control the prices
of weapons systems, military procurement agencies must find an effec-
tive way of functioning in sole-source situations.
C. PROBLEMS IN MILITARY PROCUREMENT
As modern weapons systems continue to grow more complex, the cost
of acquiring these systems continues to rise. During World War II, a
fighter plane could be purchased for under $100,000. At these rel-
atively low prices, a large number of companies were able to submit
competing designs and prototypes. The Government was able to select
the best design and purchase the aircraft in substantial numbers.
The limiting factor for the number of aircraft obtained was not the
cost, but the number of pilots available to fly them. Today the
situation is different. The limiting factor is not the pilots, but
the tremendous cost to the Government of purchasing and maintaining
modern aircraft. The F-14 Tomcat fighter plane will have a purchase
price of approximately $16,700,000 and will have a life-cycle cost of
between $80 and $100 million per aircraft. The Navy can afford to buy
only 350 of these weapons. Even small countries such as Egypt have
more than 350 MIG-21 (comparable to the F-4) aircraft. It is argued
[Ref. E] that it is the number of aircraft available (rather than
minor differences in the performance of each type) that is of military
significance. 5 The problem of rising costs of aircrafts has paral-
lels in virtually every other type of modern day weapons system.
The rising cost of providing adequate weapons for our armed forces
5See page 70, Ref. E.
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is becoming a serious obstacle for our military planners. The control
of the costs of weapons systems is a challenge that must be met by
military procurement officials.
To keep military procurement costs within acceptable levels, the
military must do two things. First, decisions must be made as to the
true worth of the sophistication being built into today's weapons
(e.g. An F-14 cost about five times as much as an F-4 . Is an F-14
really worth five Phantom Jets?). Second, military procurement agen-
cies must see to it that the armed forces get a dollar's worth of
value for each dollar spent.
An unfortunate side effect of the staggering costs of modern wea-
pons systems is that the large initial capital outlays necessary for
production have severely reduced the number of companies that are able
to enter the competition. Today, there are only a handful of aircraft
companies, shipbuilders, arms manufacturers, etc. that have sufficient
financial resources to allow them to compete for government contracts.
Even among these, many require some form of financial support from
the Government
.
The net effect of limited competition among defense suppliers is
that operating inefficiencies tend to persist much longer than they do
in a truly competitive environment. All too often one hears stories
of contractors placing bids based on honest but optimistic cost esti-
mates only to discover, after the contract has been awarded, that the
true costs are much higher. Regardless of the type of contract used
,
the Government usually winds up paying the increased costs. If a
cost-reimbursable type of contract is used, the added cost is passed
on to the Government automatically. If a fixed price type of contract
13

is used, the cost increase is passed on to the Government in the fonn
of:
(1) claims by the contractor against the Government,
(2) greatly increased prices for follow-on purchases, or
(3) outright requests for financial relief for the contractor.
While a portion of these cost increases are undoubtedly caused by un-
forseen developments, it is likely that a significant amount of them
are the result of inefficient and uneconomical operating practices.
If the nation is to derive the optimum benefit from its defense
dollars, some means must be employed to determine what constitutes
a fair and reasonable price for a given weapons system. A good price
is one that provides an adequate profit to the defense contractor to
keep him in business, yet does not pay for his wasteful and unnecessary
business practices. Current military procurement policies rely heavily
upon the effects of free, open market competition to assure efficient,
economical contractor operation. As the number of defense contractors
shrinks, the forces of open competition become more ineffective. Under
the current conditions, the best price obtainable by normal military
procurement methods is not always a fair and reasonable price.
To determine what constitutes a fair and reasonable contract price,
military procurement agencies must be able to do four basic things:
(1) Determine what it ought to cost to fulfill the obligations
of the contract if the operations were reasonably efficient.
(2) Evaluate how a contractor operates his plant, and to point
out any inefficiencies that exist.
(3) Recommend to the contractor ways to improve his operation.
(4) Persuade the contractor to accept the recommendations and to
14

discontinue the use of old inefficient operations as stan-
dards for estimating future costs.
Normal procurement methods have not always led to adequate im-
provements in contractor efficiency. Should cost studies, however,
have lead to these improvements. More efficient contractor operation
almost always results in lower prices for military weapons systems.
If properly administered, should cost can lead to improvements in con-
tractor efficiency and lower procurement costs.
15

II. SHOULD COST ANLYSIS
Years ago, a prominent nation-wide chain of retail stores began a
rigorous program of cost analysis of some of the items they bought
from suppliers. This program was an investigation into the costs of
production of the items under study. The thrust of the program was
aimed at evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the manufac-
turing operations of the firm's suppliers. The intent of this effort
was to use the resulting data to determine what would constitute a
fair and reasonable purchase price for the items under study assuming
the supplier was operating with a reasonable degree of manufacturing
efficiency. The information obtained was applied in the negotiations
for the purchase of the items. While other forms of purchase price
analysis had been used before, the store had never attempted to so
fully engage its suppliers. The Army Logistics Management Command
[Ref. FJ and Siewart [Ref. G] briefly discuss this first should cost
approach to contract pricing.
In recent years the Armed Forces have adopted an expanded versi n
of should cost as a possible means of improving the efficiency of ' le
military procurement system. Should cost, as it is currently employed,
is discussed in the following paragraphs.
A. WHAT IS A SHOULD COST ANALYSIS?
A should cost analysis is basically a very detailed industrial
efficiency study applied to defense production contracts. In the
modern sense of the term, it is a management audit focused primarily
upon the manufacturing operations of a given defense supplier. A
should cost analysis examines all phases of the supplier's manufacturing
16

process, managerial capabilities, and financial position. It fully
examines not only historical cost data, but the production methods
used, efficiency achieved, cost allocation policies, and the contrac-
tor's managerial expertise. Should cost differs from normal price
analysis methods primarily in the depth of analysis and the scope of
the study. An in-depth description of the should cost concept can be
found in the Should Cost Analysis Guide [Ref . Hj published by the
U.S. Army Material Command.
B. WHY PERFORM A SHOULD COST ANALYSIS?
The conventional method of contract price negotiation works veil
in situations where true competition exists among suppliers. In this
type of environment, the Government can rely on the forces of free
competition to provide efficient manufacturing operations. In these
instances it is assumed that contractor efficiency will result in fair
and reasonable prices for defense supplies.
In the sole-source environment, competitive forces are completely
absent leaving the Government negotiators in a weak bargaining posi-
tion. The objective of a should cost analysis is to provide govern-
ment negotiators (who work in this sole-source environment) with an
independent, realistic, and honest estimate of what a given production
operation ought to cost if the manufacturer were to perform in a
reasonably efficient manner. The alternative cost estimate produced
by the should cost analysis gives the government negotiators more
leverage at the bargaining table.
The output of a should cost analysis is:
(1) An evaluation of the supplier's operation.
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(2) An estimated production contract price based on reasonably
attainable economy and efficiency.
(3) A list of recommendations by which the supplier can reach
the efficiency goals of the should cost team.
During contract negotiations, the government team will treat the should
cost analysis results as an alternative to the contractor's proposal.
Each side (i.e. the government and the supplier) will use their own
cost estimates as a negotiating baseline. When negotiations are in-
fluenced by the results of a should cost study, improved supplier
efficiency and lower contract prices generally result. If, by using
the should cost price as a baseline, the Government is able to achieve
a lower contract price, the contractor is usually pressured into
adopting 'the efficiency improvement recommendations necessary to meet
this lower price.
The achievement of lower purchase prices for specific, items is the
short range goal of should cost studies. The long range goal is the
improvement of the efficiency of the supplier's manufacturing opera-
tions. Rule [Ref. I J discusses the short and long range goals of
should cost. Most sources agree that the major benefits that accrue
from a should cost effort are the result of the long range goals of
the study. Improved production efficiency provides lower contract
prices to the Government for years to come.
Most recommendations made by should cost study teams call for
changes that would have come about without outside pressure had the
company's management looked closely into the situation. Radical,
sweeping changes are rarely suggested by a should cost team. The
impact of should cost comes from the re-directing of management
18

attention toward neglected (and thus inefficient) areas, not from
increased government control over contractors. In the absense of
market competition, should cost is a means of providing the pressure
to urge improvements in production efficiency.
C. WHEN IS A SHOULD COST ANALYSIS CONDUCTED?
A should cost analysis is conducted whenever the following condi-
tions are met:
1. Benefits Exceed Costs
The Government must believe that the benefits derived from such
an effort will exceed the costs. It is expensive to maintain and
support a should cost team at a supplier's plant. Stolarow [Ref. J
J
estimated the cost of the should cost study done in conjunction with
the MK-48 torpedo procurement to be approximately $4 million. Cole-
man [Ref. KJ discusses the MK-48 study in detail. This particular
study was unusually expensive, but even relatively small studies usu-
ally cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. These costs must
be weighed against the possible benefits that a should cost study is
capable of providing. The following list describes some of the bene-
fits which have resulted from recent should cost studies:
(1) Contract price reductions as in the case of the Hawk Missile
study [Ref. S]
.
(2) Improvements of contractor efficiency as in the case of the
Pratt & Whitney study [Ref. i].
(3) Improvement in government procurement pactices as in the





Sufficient Manpower is Available
A should cost study can require that a large team of govern-
ment specialists be assigned to the supplier's plant for a long period
of time. The should cost study done at Pratt & Whitney required that
over forty high ranking government procurement specialists be main-
tained at the factory for more than three months. Rule [Ref . i] and
Freeman [Ref. L] both comment on the demands for manpower made by a
should cost study.
3. Sufficient Time is Available
To be effective, a should cost study must be carefully planned
and competently administered. If ample time is not available, the
study will have to be hurried or abbreviated. The resultant degrada-
tion of the quality of the output of such a study can make its worth
questionable. Before a should cost study is undertaken, it must be
assured that contracting pressures or needs of the service will not
unduely limit the time available for the study. The length of time
required may be from three months to as much as a year.
4. Government Agencies Can Spare the Manpower
In the majority of the should cost studies, the manpower re-
quired is drawn from both the military and the civilian agencies
within the Government. The specialists which make up should cost teams
are usually very talented employees who occupy key positions in their
respective agencies. When these talented people are removed from




5 . Contract Conditions Are Proper
Procurement
,
Should Cost by the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
[Ref . M] discusses criteria which must be met if a should cost analysis
is to be considered appropriate. All military services performing
should cost studies abide by these criteria. These criteria are listed
below:
a. The Supplier Must Do a Predominant Amount of Business with
the Government
.
If the contractor does a significant amount of business in
the civilian marketplace, he will be forced by the pressures of com-
petition to be efficient. It is assumed that this efficiency will
carry over into his work for the Government. If sufficient civilian
business is absent, a method such as should cost may be necessary and
justified.
b. The Contractor Must Be a Sole-Source Supplier.
If there is more than one source of supply for the item
being procured, it is fair to assume that there will be some form of
price competition among these suppliers. Furthermore, if price com-
petition exists, efficiency of operations and reasonable price proposals
are assumed to result.
c. There Must Be a High Probability of Significant Follow-On
Business.
There must be a high probability that a significant
amount of government business will be awarded to the supplier at some
future date. It would not be economical to conduct a detailed should
cost analysis if only the immediate short range goals would be rea-
lized. The full impact of a should cost study cannot be achieved if
21

the long range goals are ignored. To reap the benefits of the long
range efficiency improvements, the Government must do follow-on busi-
ness with the supplier.
d. The Contract Must Be of High Dollar Value.
If the contract is not of high dollar value, the cost of
doing the should cost study will probably exceed the possible savings
that the study will bring about. Only high-dollar-value procurements
are qualified for a should cost analysis.
e. Substantial Increase in Prices with More Increase Likely
to Follow.
The situation must be one where the production contract
price has risen substantially from the original estimate and further
rises appear likely to occur. Significant price increases not related
to design changes usually indicate some type of operating
inefficiency.
D. HOW IS A SHOULD COST ANALYSIS CONDUCTED?
Every should cost study is unique because the circumstances whicV
surround each individual procurement vary. However, while the detai s
of each analyses differ, all analyses adhere to the same basic pattern
described below:
1. Determine That a Study is Needed
This decision is usually made by the activity in the Defense
Department that is buying the item in question. The decision may also
be made by the Material Commands of the three services. Since the
decision to conduct a should cost study involves the allocation of so




1. Determine the Magnitude of Effort Required
The team size has varied from service to service, but gener-
ally it has related to the dollar value and the complexity of the
contract to be studied. The determination of team size must include
consideration of possible sources of the desired manpower. The depth
of analysis and the scope of study desired must be determined at this
stage of planning since these factors will have a direct bearing on the
size of the team, the degree of talent required, and the length of time
the study will require.
3. Advance Team Visits Supplier's Plant
While the should cost team is being formed and organized, the
contractor is notified of the impending study. An advance team is
dispatched to the supplier's plant to explain what the study will
involve, what is expected of the contractor, and what the study hopes
to accomplish. The advance team makes a cursory study of the opera-
tion to determine where the problem areas generally lie. The advance
team also arranges for the maintenance and support of the full team
at the production facilities.
4. Orientation Period of the Full Team
When the full should cost team arrives at the supplier's
plant, the team members are given an orientation tour of the facili-
ties. Once they have familiarized themselves with the operation, the
should cost team begins a review of reports and financial records in
order to locate areas that seem to be incurring higher than normal




The should cost team performs a very detailed industrial ef-
ficient analysis. The analysis is, in essence, a management audit
expanded to provide an analysis of the causes and justifications of
reported costs. The thrust of the study is to question the validity
of the data presented by the contractor in his price proposal. As dis-
cussed by Siewert [Ref. G] , in many non-competitive situations, the
contractor bases his proposed price on data that he has gathered from
previous operations. In almost every case this data is presented ac-
curately and honestly by the supplier. However, if the data is based
on past inefficiencies or includes the effects on non-reoccuring
problems, the proposed contract will be unnecessarily inflated. It
is the purpose of the should cost study to bring to light these invalid
cost assumptions and inefficient methods.









8. Quality Control Procedures
9. Indirect Cost Controls and Allocations
10. Accounting and Cost Estimating Procedures.
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The Handbook of Modern Manufacturing Management by H. B. Maynard
[Ref. N] contains an excellent discussion of these and other related
areas of interest
.
6. The Analysis of the Data
When the study has been completed, the should cost team care-
fully analyzes the data that has been generated. Using the findings
and conclusions of this analysis, the should cost team will make a
list of recommendations for both the supplier and the Government to
adopt. Under the assumption that the contractor will adopt all
recommendations directed at him for his improvement and efficiency,
the should cost team develops its estimate of what the production
contract "should cost" to complete. The team then adds a reasonable
profit margin to its cost estimate and thus produces the "should cost
price" of the contract for the Government.
7. The Negotiation of the Contract
Once the should cost team has completed its work, the govern-
ment contract negotiators have the responsibility of using the study
results to obtain the best possible contract agreement for the Gov-
ernment. In a normal contract negotiation, the contractor submits
a proposal to the Government. Using data supplied by the contractor,
the government team attempts to bargain downward from the submitted
proposal. When a should cost study has been conducted, the report
and conclusions of the study will be used by the Government as a
counter-proposal to the contractor. The should cost price will be
used by the Government as its negotiation baseline and the contractor
will use his proposed price as his baseline. Negotiations will con-




It is a mistake to believe that the should cost price is the
only price that is fair for the Government. In many cases, the rec-
ommendations upon which the should cost price is based would require
large financial outlays by the contractor. Often these outlays in-
volve a degree of risk, and in every case, the return from the outlay
is not immediate. The contractor may have very sound, valid reasons
for opposing the changes suggested by the should cost team. The
Government, on the other hand, bears little risk is suggesting the
changes, but stands to benefit greatly from any resulting savings.
Theoretically, the equalibrium point must lie somewhere between the
contractor's proposal and the should cost price. The exact price
finally agreed upon will depend on the bargaining powers of the two
negotiating parties.
E. WHO PERFORMS SHOULD COST ANALYSES?
At present, all three major branches of the Armed Forces and the
General Accounting Office have adopted the should cost concept.
While each agency's version of should cost is based upon the same
general principles, the differing needs and purposes of these agencies
have resulted in marked variations in the characteristics of the
studies performed.
1. The Navy
The United States Navy was the pioneer of the use of should
cost in the Department of Defense. It was the Navy that conducted
the first should cost study in 1967 at the Pratt & Whitney division
of United Aircraft. Rule [Ref. i] , and Gwinn [Ref. o] describe the
Pratt and Whitney study from opposing point of view. While the Navy
was the trail-breaker for should cost and is convinced of the poten-
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tial the concept possesses, the Navy does not consider should cost
to be the answer to all difficult procurement problems. Coleman
[Ref. P] describes should cost as "no panacia." The Navy prefers
instead to employ should cost only as a last resort when all other
methods of cost control have failed. The General Accounting Office
[Ref. G] states that Navy officials have indicated that the Navy will
probably not conduct should cost studies in the future. It will in-
stead attempt to improve normal contracting procedures to the point
where should cost studies will not be necessary. To date, the Navy
has completed only two studies. A third was attempted, but its effect
was overshadowed by the acute financial difficulties of the contractor
under study.
Both of the efforts completed by the Navy have been massive,
wall-to-wall investigations of the contractor's operations. The Navy
tied its studies to particular contracts, but concentrated on gen-
erating improvements that affected a much larger segmenc of the
contractor's business with the Government. The Navy believes that the
most beneficial time during the contracting process to conduct a
should cost study occurs when the Government is in a position to arbi-
trarily dictate a contract price. As Rule explains [Ref. i], this
time might come during the definitization of a letter contract or a
fixed-price-incentive (successive target redetermination) contract.
In certain of these cases, the government contracting officer is able
-*-In a lecture given at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School 31 Oct
1972, RAdm. R. G. Freeman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Pro-
curement and Production) indicated that he believed that should cost




to dictate unilaterally the contract price (subject to possible
dispute at some later date). The contracting officer bases his price
on the should cost study findings. To win an increase in price, the
contractor must disprove the findings and defend his methods of op-
eration.
2. The Army
The United States Army is in somewhat of a different procure-
ment situation than is the Navy. It does not have nearly as many
major systems under developement as does the Navy. Consequently, it
is in a position to more carefully monitor the progress of those
systems it is acquiring. The Army did not adopt should cost as
quickly as did the Navy. Once it had adopted the concept, the Army
quickly became an enthusiastic supporter. The Army considers should
cost to be an excellent method of controlling contract prices. An
article in Federal Contracts Reports [Ref . RJ discusses the Army's
satisfaction with should cost. General Miley [Ref. s] states that
the Army has completed fourteen should cost studies thus far and has
five more in progress at the present time.
Army should cost studies are far more regulated and institu-
tionalized than are those of the Navy. The Army has published
thorough guidebooks [Ref . H] and regulations covering the conduct
of an Army should cost study. The Army maintains a "should cost
library" and a five-day should cost school for prospective team mem-
bers at Fort Lee, Virginia.
Army should cost studies are tied closely to a particular
contract. The studies are made on relatively small dollar value con-
tracts and are made by small teams of men. Each study strives to
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achieve long range improvements, but significant effort is directed
specifically toward the contract under study. The studies themselves
are rather truncated, dealing for the most part with the more glaring
discrepancies uncovered by the advance team. The entire study usually
requires no more than nineteen weeks to complete. At the conclusion
of the study, a very detailed report is written describing fully the
team's actions and findings. This report serves as the cornerstone
of the position taken by the Army negotiators. Responsibility for
the conduct of Army should cost studies lies with the Ai-my Material
Command
.
3. The Air Force
The United States Air Force was the last of the three services
to adopt Should Cost into its procurement practices. Like the Army,
the Air Force has relatively few major weapons projects under devel-
opment. Hence, the Air Force has the time and manpower to closely
supervise each project. The Air Force was initially under no great
pressure to modify its procurement techniques since it was able to
perform relatively well using conventional methods. The Air Force
was able to take the time necessary to observe the development of
should cost in the other two services, and then adopt those portions
of the concept which it felt would be valuable to the Air Force.
The Air Force felt that the approach to should cost taken by
the Army was the most compatible with Air Force needs. As a result,
the Air Force version of Should Cost is very similar to that of the
Army. A great similarity can be found between the Air Force Should




There are certain differences between Army and Air Force
should cost philosophy, however, owing to a large extent on the
greater emphasis exhibited by the Air Force on research and devel-
opment. The Air Force includes a greater degree of flexibility in
its studies than does the Army. The Air Force places more emphasis
on the long term goals of should cost than does the Army. The
responsibility for the performance of Air Force should cost studies
rests with the individual buyer commands. In order to achieve some
degree of centralized control over studies, the buyer commands must
include a description of the proposed studies in the Advanced Pro-
curement Plan (see paragraph 1-2100 of Ref. B, or Phase I, page 10
of Ref. C) . Thus far, the Air Force has completed eighteen studies
and has one in progress at the present time.^
4. The General Accounting Office
At the request of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government,
Joint Economic Committee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) under-
took a number of should cost studies to determine if the concept
would be useful as part of GAO audits of Defense Department procure-
ments. The GAO report to Congress [Ref. Q] describes the background
and the findings of these studies. It was decided that should cost
was indeed able to provide information valuable for the evaluation
of actions taken by military procurement agencies. The GAO conducts
should cost studies primarily as a means of monitoring the effective-
ness of the military procurement agencies.
William Shaeffer, Lt. Col., USAF, AF/AGPLB, phone conversation
on the subject of Should Cost in the U. S. Air Force, 21 Dec. 1972.
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The GAO believes that the true value of shculd cost is in
the attainment of long range efficiency improvements in contractor
operations. It does not agree with the philosophy of tying the study
to a particular contract. The GAO believes that more benefit could
be gained if the study was a broad investigation of all phases of
the contractor's operations. To obtain the cooperation of the con-
tractor, the GAO advocates keeping him fully informed of the progress
of the study. It is felt that if the study can show definite areas
where money can be saved, then the contractor will be more than
willing to cooperate. Since it uses should cost as a means of mon-
itoring military procurement agencies, the GAO conducts its studies
in the post-award environment.
^Gerald Marks, Supervisor of Industrial Engineering, General
Accounting Office, phone conversation on the subject of should cost
in the GAO, 9 Jan. 1973.
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III. PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS WITH
CURRENT SHOULD COST METHODS
The Should Cost Analysis concept has tremendous potential for
helping to control rising defense costs. Should cost studies have
already served to strengthen the Government's negotiating position
in regard to several major defense contracts. As a result, this
concept has already saved the American taxpayer many millions of
dollars. Nevertheless, as this chapter explains, current should cost
techniques are not without their shortcomings. If these problems
can be overcome (or at least minimized) the should cost concept will
become even more valuable in the future.
A. EXPENSE
The should cost studies which have been performed thus far have
been very expensive undertakings. As mentioned in chapter II, the
MK-48 Torpedo should cost study cost approximately $4 million. It
costs a great deal of money to maintain a team of ten or twenty men
comfortably and productively at a contractor's plant for a period
of three or four months. Gordon Frank in a paper titled Value Engin-
eering and Should Cost [Ref. u] estimated the costs of studies to
range from a low of $50,000 to a high of $1 million.
As the Army Should Cost Guide [Ref. H] explains, a should cost
team must be provided with transportation, office space, supplies,
clerical help, communications facilities, and ready access to con-
tracting and industrial reference material. In addition, the team
members must be fed, housed, and have all routine personal needs
cared for. There are also administrative functions that must be
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performed by the military commands in order to support the should
cost teams and make proper use of the team's output. These functions
include:
(1) providing for the support of the team at the plant,
(2) handling, processing, and making decisions on the data
reported by the should cost team, and
(3) performing routine military administrative duties pertaining
to the should cost team members.
At present, each service provides and maintains its own organiza-
tion for managing and administering should cost studies. Consequently;
there exists a degree of duplication of many functions among the
services. None of the individual duties that compose the support of
a should cost study can be deleted. It is wasteful, however, to
duplicate many of the functions in all three services. For example,
the data generated by a should cost team must be carefully processed
before any meaningful conclusions can be drawn from it. Each ser-
vice has their own system for data processing. It is not practicable
in most cases to develop efficient computerized data processing
systems (like PEGASUS [Ref . V] of the MK-48 torpedo study) for rela-
tively small studies. Therefore, each service must create its own
data processing system tailored to suit its own particular techniques.
B . MANPOWER
The manpower for each should cost study is drawn from both the
military and other government agencies (e.g. the Defense Contract
Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Administration Service) . If a
should cost study is to have a chance to succeed, it must be staffed
from the beginning with very talented people. Quite often, those
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selected for a should cost team are key people in their own agencies.
Their loss, albiet temporary, creates hardships and costly ineffi-
ciencies in their own organizations. It is not advisable to lower
the standards of qualification for service on a should cost team.
Freeman has indicated [Ref. Lj that a lower quality of personnel on
should cost teams would make the studies ineffective.
Each should cost study is independent of all others, and each
study is terminated after a specified length of time. Once a should
cost study is completed, the team members are no longer needed (the
Army and the Air Force, however, both retain the head of the should
cost team to serve as the chief contract negotiator) . Since all the
services approach should cost studies on a case by case basis, it is
not feasible for them to hire and maintain a permanent should cost
staff. This leaves the services with no alternative but to draw
manpower from their own and other governmental agencies. If the
agencies cannot spare the manpower, the should cost study cannot
be conducted. The limited availability of acceptable manpower has
often been one of the factors that blocked the decision to conduct
an otherwise desired should cost study.
C. EXPERIENCE
At the supplier's plant, a significant part of the should cost
team's time is spent learning the complexities of conducting a should
cost study. The Army and the Air Force make use of a five-day school
to familiarize prospective team members with the fundamental concepts
of should cost. The Navy and the GAO have no such training program.
Miley has indicated [Ref. s] that even the most careful selection
process cannot guarantee the effectiveness of a man when he is placed
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on a should cost team. The five-day school does help, but it is no
substitute for the skills and knowledge acquired from experience.
Both the Army and the Air Force Should Cost Guidebooks [Ref. h] and
[Ref . Mj go into considerable detail about the necessary character-
istics of a should cost team member. If it were possible to utilize
the same men on many successive studies, it is more likely that a
higher degree of professionalism could be attained.
Miley [Ref. s] mentions the effort made by the Army to have
competent personnel on its should cost teams. In spite of very tho-
rough screening, it is often impossible to evaluate correctly the
effectiveness of a prospective should cost team member until he has
been a part of a study. When a man proves unsuitable or incompetent,
it is the Government and ultimately the taxpayer that must bear the
expense of replacing the man and correcting the mistakes he has made.
As long as should cost teams continue to be composed of a high per-
centage of inexperienced men, the risk of using unsuitable personnel
remains
.
D. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE CONTRACTOR
In addition to problems related to the staffing, support, and
administration of a should cost study, there are a number of problem
areas directly affecting the contractor.
1. Disruption
As mentioned by W. P. Gwinn [Ref. 0] , when a should cost
study is performed on a contractor, his schedule of operations is
invariably upset. The should cost team spends many hours at the
contractor's plant observing the manufacturing process and talking
to employees. The team makes every effort to be as unobtrusive as
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possible. Yet in spite of its best intentions, the team's presence
has a detrimental effect on the normal routine. It is also necessary
for the contractor's management to divert a large portion of its
valuable time to answering questions of the should cost team.
2. Parochialism
In the majority of should cost studies, the emphasis is
directed toward one particular contract. There is no strong incen-
tive for a service to utilize its should cost studies to gene te
improvements for other services. Any benefits that do accrue to
other services are merely spin-offs of the primary goal of the study.
The nation as a whole would benefit if all should cost studies were
directed at improving all phases of a supplier's operations rather
than being confined to a particular contract situation [lief. Q] .
3. Cooperation
The keystone of any successful should cost study is the co-
operation of the contractor being studied. If he withholds data,
refuses to discuss problems with the should cost team, or refuses to
supply necessary facilities, then the study will not yield the ben-
efits it is capable of providing. The military relies on financial
leverage (e.g. it is a sole buyer of defense items) or on quirks of
the specific contract situations (e.g. unilateral price determina-
tion of letter contracts) to obtain contractor cooperation. The GAO
promises worthwhile recommendations for cost savings as an incentive
for cooperation. The GAO report [Ref. Q] discusses methods of
Mr. James Fowler of the Office of the Supervisor of Industrial
Engineering, General Accounting Office. Phone conversation on the
subject of Should Cost, 9 January 1973.
36

obtaining contractor support. Neither the military approach nor the
GAO technique is powerful enough to guarantee that the should cost
study will be able to produce savings proportional to the cost of
the study. Too often, the methods of inducement to cooperate only
work on weak or financially distressed contractors. These contractors
would be likely to bargain reasonably if only normal contract negotia-
tion methods were forcefully employed. For a contractor to allow a
should cost team into his plant is one thing, but cooperating with
it and yielding to its recommendations is an entirely different
matter. Current should cost practices do not wield enough power to
fully realize the true potential of the should cost concept.
4. Credibility
One of the early obstacles to be overcome by a should cost
team is the low credibility assigned to the team by the contractor.
An article in Federal Contracts Report No. 449 [Ref . W] discusses
the doubts expressed by industry leaders on the subject of should
cost studies and team members. Even though a should cost team is
composed of highly skilled men, the contractor usually views them a;
outsiders who do not really understand all the intricacies at play
in the manufacturing environment. Gwinn [Ref. 0] states, many con-
tractors feel that the should cost team is not fully aware of the
total environment of the particular industry being studied. It is
feared that a team that must spend so much time learning about the
industry will not be well qualified to recommend corrections and
improvements. As long as should cost efforts remain diverse, decen-
tralized, and composed of inexperienced personnel, industry will
remain suspicious of the worth of the studies.
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D. NOT ENOUGH SHOULD COST STUDIES BEING DONE
In fiscal year 1972, the Federal Government spent about $19
billion for the procurement of military hardware." The majority of
this money was spent on sole source negotiated contracts for sophis-
ticated weapons systems. In spite of the large number of sole
source procurements made by the military in recent years only forty-
four should cost studies have been done (including ten by the GAO
which were not directly related to any contract). There can be little
doubt that there is room for more should cost studies.
The reason that more studies have not been conducted thus far
is that they place too great a burden on the armed services. As
Freeman explains [Ref. KJ , should cost studies require excessive
amounts of time and manpower to permit their frequent use. A great
deal of preparation must be made by the military procurement agencies
before a study can be conducted. In the already hectic atmosphere
of weapons procurement, this preparation can be an intolerable burden.
The real value of a should cost study lies not in the short
range benefits of immediate contract price reduction, but in long
range benefits realized over a period of years from contractor effi-
ciency improvements.- The military must have money to function. It
exists from year to year and budget to budget being careful to justify
each action and request. While all services recognize the importance
of long range improvements, their actions must yield short range
benefits as well. A should cost study must also be able to provide
2




immediate benefits to the service if the study is to be undertaken.
Consequently, many studies that would be of great value to the tax-
payer after a period of years are not conducted because the services
are incentivized for short range goals rather than long range goals.
E. LACK OF TOTAL INDEPENDENCE
One of the more subtle shortcomings of our present method of
dealing with should cost studies in the military is that, when viewed
from a broad perspective, both the military and the contractor have
the same objective. Both parties want to produce and deploy weapons
systems with the minimum amount of turmoil and confusion. There is
no serious doubt that military procurement officers are as honest and
honorable as any other group of men in the country. They make every
effort to act in the best interest of their country as they see it.
Any suggestion that collusion and misdealings in military procurement
agencies are the cause of current weapons acquisition difficulties
would be foolish and irresponsible. Yet it connot be denied that the
common goal military procurement officers share with the contractor
must tend to preclude a totally objective, independent attitude
toward contractor performance.
A should cost study is not intended to set a contract price.
•Instead, it is intended to provide the government negotiators with
a stronger bargaining position. If, in the interest of expediency
(or some other service-oriented pressure)
,
government negotiatiors
do not fully exploit the strengths of their bargaining position, then
the best interests of the nation may not have been served. At present,
there is no systematic review of contract negotiations to ensure that




It is human nature to assume that the cause of the problem lies
with the other guy. In spite of the most well intentioned efforts to
the contrary, government run studies often tend to overlook faults
of the Government. A truly independent body would be able to see errors
that an even slightly biased body might overlook. It would be better
in the long run if future should cost studies were conducted by an
agency fully independent of the military or the contractors.
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IV. IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF THE
SHOULD COST ANALYSIS CONCEPT
The should cost analysis concept is a technique which can enable
government contract negotiators to extract more real value from dollars
expended for defense. Problems exist in the current methods of employ-
ing the should cost concept which prevent it from achieving its full
capabilities. If should cost is to reach its maximum potential
effectiveness, changed must be made in the manner in which the concept
is being utilized. The following paragraphs are recommendations for
changes which will help to make the should cost concept more beneficial,
A. RESPONSIBILITY
The responsibility for the conduct and coordination of all should
cost studies ought to lie with one single agency. There are important
benefits that would be gained if all should cost studies were directed
by one single authority rather than by four as is currently the case.
These benefits are:
1. Minimize Duplication
Should cost studies conducted by a single central agency could
be planned so that the results of the studies would be useful to all
interested services. It would thus be possible for each service to
make use of the results of a single comprehensive study rather than
have each service conduct its own truncated study. While this would
make the combined stUdy more difficult to plan and conduct, it would be
cheaper and more cost-effective than conducting two or three similar
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studies. Naturally, a unified should cost study could seldom be used
for the actual negotiation of more than one contract. However, the
scope of such a study would be broad and the emphasis would be on
identifying long range inefficiency problems. The results of the
study could be used by government negotiators from all three services
for several years.
2. Better Contractor Selection
A central agency in control of all should cost studies would
be able to base its selection of contractors on the needs of the nation
rather than the needs of the service. The resources of a central
agency could be directed toward those contractors in most need of study
(regardless of service affiliation) . Contraints arising from service
boundries and spheres of influence would be avoided. A central agency,
independent of the military, would be able to view objectively the
overall defense procurement environment.
3. Better Information Dissemination
A central agency could be charged with the responsibility of
systematically disseminating information on the results of all should
cost studies. This centralized reporting would be a necessary step if
unified should cost studies are to benefit all three services. Service
procurement agencies must have ready acess to the results of should
cost studies done on suppliers with which they are planning to negotiate,
Currently there is very little inter-service transfer of should cost
information.
In the course of conducting research for this paper, the author
discussed should cost with many officials within the military. While
all seemed extremely familiar with the experiences of their own service,
few were able to discuss the application of should cost in the other
services. It must be concluded that there is little cross-fertilization





A single agency charged with the responsibility of conducting all
should cost studies should support, maintain, and utilize a permanent
should cost staff. This staff could be composed of experts in
industrial engineering, engineering, law, finance, and management. In
time, this staff could be built into a very capable group of people
with experience in the should cost concept. If such a staff could be
created, it would be necessary to select, train, and evaluate new
personnel less frequently than is now demanded.
The permanent should cost staff would supply the key manpower for
routine studies. It would serve to coordinate larger studies which
would be conducted by civilian consulting firms (as was done with the
MK-48 Torpedo [Ref. V]). If a permanent staff could be created, a high
degree of should cost "professionalism" could be cultiviated. The staff
members would soon become familiar and proficient with should cost
studies. Contractors would be less doubtful of the should cost team's
ability, and would be more willing to voluntarily accept the should
cost teams recommendations.
C. EMPHASIS
The emphasis of unified should cost studies must be toward
identifying problem areas that affect the suppliers entire operation.
To fully justify the time, money, and effort of an expanded should
cost study, the findings of that study must be of value to all agencies
of the Government who might someday do business with the contractor.
Currently, should cost studies are concerned primarily with satisfying
the - needs of the military service which sponsors the study. Future
unified studies must generate recommendations that will benefit all
services rather than just one.
43

The emphasis of unified studies must be placed on locating long
range efficiency improvements to the supplier's operation. These
long range improvements will help to keep procurement costs low for
many years to come. The usual short range goal of current should
cost studies (a lower contract price) will not be a major objective
of unified studies since this objective can only benefit one agency.
D. INDEPENDENCE
The agency charged with the responsibility of conducting all should
cost studies must be completely independent of both the military and
the defense industry. To be truly effective, a should cost study
must be able to take a completely objective look at each facit of produc-
tion operation. It must not be influenced by:
(1) the needs of any particular group,
(2) any pressures felt by any party involved, or
(3) any factor not related to the efficient completion of the
contract.
There are many agencies not directly related to either the military
or to the defense industry who are in a more independent position than
are the military pricurement agencies. For example, the Treasury
Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of
Commerce could be relatively independent of military or contractor
influences. These independent agencies would be much more likely than
are the military agencies to attack sensitive areas of the contract and
to question the Government's position. The military agencies are




A should cost study sponsored by an independent agency is likely
to make the military's procurement job more complex. The agency will
challenge proceedures used by the military which appear to be ineffic-
ient. It will also be less inclined to allow the contractor to
continue inefficient practices for the sake of expediency. The goal
of a unified should cost study would be to make more efficient use of
tax revenues, not merely to reduce contract prices.
E. CAPABILITY
Any agency charged with conducting should cost studies must have
the capabilities necessary to perform the studies well. These necessary
capabilities include:
1. Knowledge of Financial Reporting
A facility for dealing with financial data is vital for an
agency that conducts should cost studies. The agency must be able to
deal with the contractor's financial experts en an equal basis. To
conduct a useful study, a should cost team must be able to understand
and intelligently discuss the contractor's financial position. To
understand his financial position, the should cost team (thus the
agency) must be able to understand the contractor's programs policies,
and problems. This, in turn, requires a familiarity with current
financial practices and reporting techniques.
2. Knowledge of Industrial Engineering
The agency conducting should cost studies must be familiar
with the aspects of industrial engineering that relate to weapons
production. If a should cost study is to determine where efficiency
problem areas lie and then make recommendations for improvement, then





One of the key pre-requisites for a successful should cost
team is the ability to cooperate and function as a team rather than as
a group of individuals. Any agency undertaking a should cost study
must share the philosphy of close team coordination in its day-to-day
activities. Its people must have been exposed to the pressures of
and they must have performed well under team conditions.
A. Broad Economic Viewpoint
If a single agency is to be given total responsibility for
conducting all should cost studies, then that agency must be one that
is able to think in terms of the- entire national economy. The agency
must have a broad perspective on the needs of the military and the
capability of the economy to absorb the cost or" meeting those needs.
It must be able to appraise realistically the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the defense industry and of the particular contractor
under study. All this requires access to and familiarily with the
financial and economic plans of the Government. It also requires the
ability to make use of what ever financial data that is available froc
the contractor.
5. Influence
It is important that an agency which conducts all should cost
studies be in a position to spread its findings around to other inter-
ested parties. If the military procurement agencies do not receive or
do not pay heed to the results of a should cost study, the possible
benefits of the study will be lost. The agency should have the capabi-
lity of monitoring the procuring activities and the defense contractors





If future should cost authority is to be vested in a single
agency, that agency should be given the ability and the authority to
conduct a greater number of studies than are currently being under-
taken. There are literally thousands of military procurement actions
each year that would benefit significantly from a should cost study.
Because of a lack of manpower, time, and/or money, only a handful
of studies are done each year.
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V. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
AS THE SOLE AGENCY FOR THE
CONDUCT OF SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
There are a number of Federal agencies that have the capability of
assuming the role of sole should cost agency. Among these candidates
are; the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget,
the Treasury Department, and the Department of Commerce. Each of these
agencies has an interest (direct or indirect) in the funds expended
for weapons systems. However, it is this writer's opinion that the
General Accounting Office (CAO) is a far better choice than any of these
other agencies. The bases for this writer's opinion on the matter is
discussed in this chapter.
A. WHY SELECT THE GAO?
1. Capability
The GAO has proven itself to be fully capable of conducting
should cost studies. It has already successfully conducted four studies
on civilian owned firms [Ref. Q.] and six studies on governmental
owned facilities. The staff of the GAO would have to be enlarged if
all should cost were to become its responsibility. The GAO has shown,
however, that its people are able to perform these studies effectively.
Since the GAO deals primarily with financial matters, it clearly
has the capability to probe intelligently into the financial data and
reports of a contractor. The GAO's long history of conducting audits
provides an excellent foundation upon which to build an organization
to conduct should cost studies. Regardless of the connotation of
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the title "Should Cost Analysis", such studies are actually no more
than detailed management audits of the industrial practices of
contractors. The GAO corrently refers to a should cost study as an
"Industrial Management Review" [Ref. t] . When the audit (or Review)
has been completed, the GAO should cost team carries the results
further to generate recommendations for improvements and to estimate
a should cost price for the contract.
2. Organizational Purpose
The GAO is charged with the responsibility for monitoring the
manner in which government agencies expend the funds allocated to
them by Congress. Each year, the GAO reports to Congress on how funds
were spent, what deviations from budget occurred (if any), and how
effective the various agencies' managements were in controlling their
expenditures of funds. Harris [Ref. X] provides additional insight
into the functions of the GAO.
Over the years the GAO's authority and responsibility have
been expanded to include more than just the duties and responsibilitie
of an accountant. Now, the GAO not only investigates the validity
of reported costs, but it also evaluates the practices that led to
the incurrance of the costs.
In the 1972 publication Standards for Audit of Governmental
Organizations, Programs, Activities, & Functions [ Ref . Y J the
Comptroller General of the United States stated that:
"...auditing is no longer a function concerned
primarily with financial operations. Instead,
governmental auditing now is concerned with whether
governmental organizations are achieving the purposes
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for which programs are authorized and funds are
made available, are doing so economically and
efficiently, and are complying with applicable
laws and regulations."
A should cost study is, in reality, a version of the types of audits
contemplated by the Comptroller General in the preceding quote.
The GAO has the authority to monitor the expenditures of the
various military procurement agencies. The should cost analysis concept
is an excellent method for monitoring certain of these expenditures.
Since should cost is similar to the modern GAO audit, sole should
cost authority would be a logical expanison of the GAO's present
duties.
The four should cost studies previously previously performed
by the GAO on civilian owned companies were conducted to determine
if should cost would be a useful technique for use by the GAO in audits
of military procurement agencies. These GAO studies did, in fact,
prove to be of value in evaluating the procurement agencies and the
procurement process. If the GAO were to perform a greater number of
should cost studies, it would be better able to carry out its present
function as a monitor of military expenditures.
3. Vantage Point
The GAO is in an excellent position to observe the impact
that a should cost study has on the entire federal budget. The GAO's
duties as monitor of federal expenditures provides it with a broad
overview of the economy and the defense industry. This overview
would give the GAO a unique advantage in selecting contractors for
should cost studies. Current should cost study selections are made
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to maximize the benefits received by a single agency (or service)
.
If the GAO were the sole agency conducting should cost studies, it
could select contractors in a manner that would maximize the benefits
to the national economy as a whole.
4. Independence
The GAO is reasonably independent of the military establishment,
It is also reasonably independent of the Executive branch of the
Government. Independence is an important attribute for an audit
function. The GAO's independence would permit it to report freely
any inadequacies it discovered in governmental agencies. The same
independence would permit the GAO to employ should cost in a manner
which would best suit the needs of the nation as a whold. A military
should cost study team, on the other hand, might be tempted to yield
to pressures to expedite their study in order to allow a contractor
to begin delivery of his prodict as soon as possible. Since the GAO is
not directly related to the military or to contractors, it would not
be influenced by such operational pressures.
The GAO is also in a better position to criticize objectively
the military procurement proceedures. For example, in the Navy study
of Pratt & Whitney, only one out of a total of seventy-fo UT recommen-
dations for improvement was directed toward the Government [Ref. 0]
.
On the other hand, the original four studies by the GAO listed many
areas in which the Government was at fault [Ref. Q ].
5. Influence
As explained by Harris [Ref. X], the GAO wields considerable
financial power over the agencies it monitors. In addition, the
Congress relies heavily upon the GAO's recommendations concerning
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fiscal policy and budget allocations. This power, coupled with the
authority of the GAO to audit agencies at its discretion, gives the
GAO tremendous influence over the military procurement agencies.
Consequently, a should cost study conducted by the GAO would carry
more weight with the military procurement agencies than would a
similar study conducted by a military team.
Upon completion of a military should cost study, the results
are turned over to the government neogtiating team. During contract
negotiations, the government team is free to use the results of
the study as they see fit. The degree to which the government team
pursues the should cost study objectives may be influenced by many
other factors such as expediency, needs-of-the-service, or pressures
from operational commanders. Thus, when only the military is involved,
all the potential benefits of a should cost study may net be fully
realized.
A should cost study done by the GAO would be likely to be
<
more influential in contract negotiations. The military procurement
agencies would still be free to make whatever use they saw fit of
the should cost study results. However, the subsequent procurement
contract would be subject to audit by the GAO in light of the GAO
should cost study conclusions. Thus, the military agencies would
be forced to explain and defend their utilization of the results of
the GAO studies. In addition, other contracts negotiated with this
same supplier at some later date could still be reviewed by the GAO
in light of the original study. Thus, should cost studies conducted
by the GAO would have a significant immediate impact on current
contract negotiations, and would also have an effect on contracts




The conduct of an audit of a governmental agency is a very
complex task. All efforts of the auditing team must be carefully
coordinated during all phases of the proceedure. The GAO is exper-
ienced at conducting audits of agencies of all sizes. Over the years,
this experience has developed a sense of teamwork and cooperation
among GAO personnel. Like an audit, a should cost analysis also
requires a team approach if an effective job is to be done. Nearly all
sources of should cost information mention close coordination of
efforts as a necessary prerequisite for a successful should cost study.
This team spirit is an important attribute which causes the GAO to
be well suited to the task of performing should cost studies.
B. PROPOSED GAO ORGANIZATION FOR SHOULD COST
1. Legal Authority
If the GAO were to assume the status of sole should cost
authority in the Federal Government, it would have to be given expanded
statutory powers [Ref. Q ]. The GAO would have to be granted the
authority to review all data on a defense contractor's facility
that related to defense work. The GAO would require the following
three concessions:
(1) GAO must be able to examine the contractor's facilities,
(2) GAO must be able to study the contractor's books and
records, and
(3) GAO must be provided with a reasonable degree of
cooperation by the contractor's management and
personnel.
This extra legal. authority could only come from the Congress, but it
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could be granted in a number of forms. This writer believes that the
best form would be a modification to the ASPR. A clause could be
required in every defense contract (over a specified dollar value
threshhold) which would guarantee the right of the GAO to conduct
should cost studies at its descretion.
2. Organization
The GAO would also have to undergo a reorganization to
accomodate the new burden of should cost studies. A separate office
within the GAO could be created with the sole function of organizing,
conducting and reporting on should cost studies. Specialists in
finance, law, engineering accounting, management, and industrial engin-
eering activities would be required. The size of the staff would have
to be determined by the number of studies which the GAO intended to
perform and the depth to which the GAO intended to probe.
Small scale studies could be staffed by personnel drawn
exclusively from the permanent should cost staff. If required, technical
advice might be supplied by a few military personnel drawn from the
appropriate military service. These small scale studies could be
supported and supervised by the permanent GAO should cost staff.
.
Large scale studies (which required more time and manpower
than the GAO was able to provide) could be contracted out to civilian
consulting firms (as was done by the Navy with the MK-48 torpedo).
In this case, the GAO should cost staff would serve as a coordinator
for the study.
3. Reporting Results
The importance of adequately reporting the results of GAO
should cost studies cannot be over-emphasized. The writing and
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issuance of comprehensive reports would be one of the primary duties
of the permanent GAO should cost staff. The military procurement
officials (of all branches of service) would have to be able to make
use of GAO studies. They would have to have complete knowledge of
the findings, agreements, and recommendations arrived at by the should
cost study team. The contractor would have to be fully (and formally)
informed of the recommendations for improvement at his plant.
There are other groups besides the contractors and the military
procurement agencies who ought to be informed of the results of
should cost studies. The government Administrative Contracting Officer
(ACO) , his staff, and all military plant representatives should be
informed of the results of the studies. These are the people who
provide the day-to-day monitoring of the contractor. They evaluate
the degree to which the contractor adheres to the various clauses and
stipulations finally agreed upon in the contract. The GAO staff
would keep these administrative personnel fully aware of the findings
of the should cost studies. These people would be able to act as a
quasi should cost study team. They would provide for even greater
effectiveness of the should cost concept.
C. PROPOSED METHOD OF OPERATION
1. Initiation of Should Cost Studies
The ultimate purpose of a should cost study is to promote
more efficient use of the nation's tax dollars. Any agency that
could benefit from a should cost study ought to be able to initiate
such an effort. If a single agency (i.e., the GAO) were to conduct
all should cost studies, that agency would have to remain receptive to
the views of the other agencies. Any of the following agencies ought
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to be able to formally recommend that a should cost study be undertaken:
a. The Military.
The military services should be able to request that
should cost studies be performed on specific contractors. If the
military procurement officials are to be asked to turn over to the
GAO one of their most promising contract pricing weapons, then they
must be able to expect that should cost studies will be done at least
as frequently as they are now. The prospect of having high quality
studies done at no expense and with no crippling manpower drain would
be a strong incentive for acceptance of the GAO as sole should cost
authority. However, the military would want some influence in the
selection of contractors for study.
b. The Congress
The Congress should be able to recommend that the GAO
conduct should cost studies on specific contractors within the defense
industry. This would provide the Congress with another tool for use
in conjunciton with its investigations of the defense industry. The
availability of additional leverage would help to convince Congress
that expanded statuory powers for the GAO is justified.
c. The GAO
The final decision of whether or not a given should cost
study should be undertaken must rest with the GAO. It is the GAO that
would have to provide the money, manpower, and effort that are required
to perform a successful study. Hence, the performing agency should




2. When a Should Cost Study Would Be Made
If it were the sole should cost authority, the GAO could base
its decision of whether or not to conduct a study on the following
criteria:
a. Justification
In the opinion of the GAO, the proposed should cost study
would have to be one of rising production costs, a high dollar value
project, and a high probability of follow-on government business.
Since the GAO would be able to employ statutory powers for its authority,
the other usual criteria (i.e., sole-source, preponderence of government
business) could be relaxed. Freedom from dependency on financial
presure could allow the GAO to conduct its studies on a far wider range
of defense contractors.
b. Ability of GAO
The GAO would have to have the necessary resources to conduct
or coordinate any study that was undertaken. If the GAO was short of
manpower or facilities and was unable to obtain sufficient assistance,
then the GAO would have to turn down the request for a study. If a
study could not be adequately supported, it could not yield its
potential benefits.
c. Necessity
In the opinion of the GAO, there could be no other way to
achieve a reasonable contract price. All other normal avenues of attack
would have been attempted without success. One of the purposes of
the GAO monitoring military procurement agencies is to promote improve-
ments in the abilities and practices of those agencies. If should cost
studies were conducted whenever minor difficulties were encountered
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in military procurement, the studies would be counter-productive. They
would induce procurement agencies to perform half-heartedly in the hopes
that the GAO would take action and hammer the contractor into line.
3. Planning and Conducting the Should Cost Study
Having made the decision to perform the proposed should cost
study, the GAO would next carefully formulate its plan of action. The
GAO would conduct the study as it related to a specific contract, but
the study would not need to be confined soley with contractor operations
that dealt with that contract. The GAO would be in a position to
recommend improvements that would affect all phases of operation that
affected the Government.
The actual conduct of a GAO should cost study would be no
different than those being conducted by the military at present (or
by the GAO in the past). The GAO would be able to make its studies
as broad as it felt was justified, as intensive as it felt was needed,
and as thorough as it felt capable of doing. The actual mechanics
of the GAO should cost studies would be identical to the mechanics
of current studies.
The last step in a GAO study would be the writing of a detaile
report of the studies findings and conclusions. All study recommendations
would be listed and fully explained. Copies of this report would be
sent to all interested agencies. All three branches of the Armed
Forced (as well as any other government agency that might do business
with the contractor) would receive copies of the report.
4. After the Study is Completed
After the GAO had completed its study and had sent its report
to the appropriate agencies, the procuring agency would conduct the
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negotiations. The agnecy could use the GAO should cost study results
in the same manner in which present study results are used. It could
use the results as a cost and price baseline (independent from the
contractor's data) from which to begin negotiations. The military
agency would use the GAO study results to try to obtain lower contract
prices and more efficient contractor operation. In spite of the
expanded legal authority of the GAO, the should cost price would in
no way be binding on the contractor. The final contract price would
depend, as always, on how well the government negotiating team does its
job.
Once the contract had been signed, the GAO would be able to
evaluate how effectively the government negotiators performed. Having
conducted the should cost study themselves, the GAO agents would be
familiar with the product, the contractor, and the circumstances
surrounding the procurement. They would be able to meaningfully
evaluate the trade-offs made by the government negotiation team. From
this evaluation, the GAO would recommend improvements to military
procurement methods.
If, at some future date, a military procurement agency desired
to negotiate with a contractor who had been the recipient of a GAO
should cost study, the agency would still be able to make use of the
same study. Since the GAO study would have concentrated on long term
goals, the military agency could base its negotiation baseline on
the projected results of the should cost efficiency improvements. A
quick investigation would reveal to what extent the contractor chose
to incorporate the study's recommendations.
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VI. BENEFITS DERIVED FROM MAKING THE GAP
THE SOLE SHOULD COST AGENCY
Thus far, the should cost studies conducted by various agencies
of the Federal Government have been effective in reducing contact
prices. In the opinion of this writer, the efficiency and effectiveness
of should cost studies could be greatly enhanced if all future studies
were conducted and controlled by one central agency.
As explained in the preceding chapter, this writer believes that
the GAO is the agency most uniquely suited for this responsibility. If
the GAO were granted sole authority to conduct future should cost
studies, this writer further believes that several benefits could be
expected to result. This chapter discusses these potential benefits.
A. BENEFITS TO THE GAO
If the GAO were to become the sole should cost agency, several
benefits would most likely accrue to the GAO itself. The most likely
improvement that could be expected to accrue would be a significant
increase in the overall ability of the GAO to monitor and evaluate
military procurement agencies. Sole should cost authority would enable
the GAO to make quantitative judgements on the procurement performance
selected military agencies. These quantitative evaluations could be
made by comparing the final contract prices on various contracts with
the corresponding should cost price generated by the should cost studies
conducted on respective contractors. The resulting improvement in the
capability of the GAO to monitor and evaluate military procurement




Sole should cost authority would most likely improve the GAO's
overall understanding of defense expenditures. More should cost exper-
ience, would lead to a more thorough understanding of the actual problems
of defense contractors. As a result of these studies, the GAO would
gain first hand knowledge of the conditions and profit margins of the
various defense industries. As the GAO performed more and more should
cost studies, its permanent should cost staff would develop into an
elite cadre of experts on the subject of the defense industry. With
this added measure of expertise and understanding, the GAO would better
be able to make valuable recommendations to congress on matters
concerning military spending and budget requests.
The* GAO currently considers post-award surveys to be an important
means of insuring that the contractor adequately fulfills his contractual
obligations. If total should cost authority were vested in the GAO,
it is likely that the GAO would require fewer post-award surveys.
Intense should cost investigations would make post-award studies
unnecessary in many cases. Even when the GAO decided to conduct a
post-award study in addition to the should cost study, the post-award
study would be much easier to conduct. For example, if the GAO conduc ed
the should cost study on a contractor, the GAO agents would gain a good
understanding of the details of the contractor's facilities and his
products. Consequently, follow-on post-award surveys (which would
provide an excellent opportunity to determine the extent to which should
cost recommendations have been adopted) would be greately simplified.
B. BENEFITS TO THE MILITARY
It is likely that the benefits accrueing to the military from the
concentration of should cost authority in the GAO would far out-weigh
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the detriments of such a change. The most likely benefit to the military
would be the tremendous savings in time, money, and manpower that could
accrue to the services. Should cost studies currently consume these
resources to an extent that the services can ill-afford. By far the
most critical of the three resources is manpower. If the GAO were to
become the sole should cost agency, the military would supply the GAO
technical advise on the military implications of suggestions made by
the should cost team or by the contractor. The military would not,
however, be required to use its valuable, highly talented personnel to
staff its own should cost study teams.
If the GAO were to be charged with conducting all should cost
studies (and was adequately staffed to do so) , an increase in the number
of studies conducted could be expected. There are today many procurement
situations for which a should cost study would be beneficial and cost
effective. However, only a few studies are done each year because the
military lacks the resources to conduct all the studies that need to
be done. More should cost studies- could be expected to yield a general
improvement in contractor efficiency. Improved contractor efficiency
would result in more output (i.e., more weapons) for the same input
(i.e., money and time).
The GAO could be able to investigate a wider range of contract
situations than the military is presently able to do. Expanded statutory
powers of the GAO would free the GAO from the confines of strict
dependence of financial leverage. Presently, many companies which could
be improved by a should cost study fall outside the stringent criteria
for study set by the military.
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More subtle (but equally important) than the already mentioned
benefits to the military is the fact that if the GAO conducted all
should cost studies, it would better understand the position of the
military with respect to the defense industry. The GAO would gain an
understanding of the difficulties and problems involved in the manufac-
ture of major weapons systems. It would understand the logic behind
the many decisions made during a procurement by project management
personnel. In short, having the GAO conduct all should cost studies
could be expected to make the GAO more understanding of the problems
relating to weapons system acquisition. It would be immensely benefi*-
cial to all concerned if informed, accurate, and comprehensive reports
were made which fairly presented the military's position to the Congress.
C. BENEFITS TO THE NATION
This writer believes that the concentration of should cost authority
in the GAO would provide benefits for the nation as a whole. The should
cost concept would be made much more effective if all studies were done
by a single competent agency. Improving Should Cost would result in
more efficient utilization of defense dollars. The nation could maintain
the same defensive posture for less money.
The GAO would report to Congress the results of should cost studies
done and conclusions reached. The Congress would gain a better
understanding of the real problems of the defense industry as a result
of these reports. A report published by the Committee on Government
Procurement [Ref. z] states:
"Congress must have a clear understanding of the needs and goals
for new acquisition efforts in order to exercise its responsibilities




Rayburn [Ref. AA] argues that this nations 's past emphasis on weapons
research and development has resulted in neglect of necessary develop-
ment of non-defense industries. As a consequence of this neglect,
the United States has lost much of the technological pre-eminence it
once enjoyed. While should cost studies would not by themselves reverse
this trend, their effective utilization could provide a more enlightened
Congress and military establishment, and a more efficient defense
industry. The money saved on defense could be applied to strengthening
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